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The ABL rule is derived and shown to be a tool of standard quantum mechanics.
Objections by Kastner [quant-ph/0003098v3] and others to the counterfactual
use of the ABL rule are shown to be groundless. In particular, this use is not
restricted in the way Kastner has claimed. A variant of the three-box experiment
due to Vaidman is discussed. It is argued that Born probabilities (and hence
state vectors or density operators) are not the right basis for drawing ontological
inferences. What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about the world must be
inferred from the objective ABL probabilities that are assigned to counterfactuals.
The correct inferences, however, will remain incomprensible until a prevalent but
inconsistent way of thinking about the temporal aspect of the world is rejected.
1 OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND THE ABL RULE
Following Mermin [1], I characterized some of the probabilities that quantum mechanics
allows us to calculate as being objective in the sense that they have nothing to do with
ignorance|there is nothing for us to be ignorant of [2]. In order to be objective, they
must be calculated on the basis of all relevant facts. If we calculate the probability
p (qi, t) that a measurement of the observable Q at the time t yields the result qi, then
p (qi, t) is objective just in case the calculation takes account of all relevant property-
indicating events (a.k.a. measurement results), no matter at what time they occur or
are obtained. Otherwise p (qi, t) is subjective; it contains an element of ignorance; it is
not the best possible estimate that we can make.
Quantum mechanics is unequivocal about the probabilities it assigns to the possible
results of possible measurements. (Unfortunately the language in which we customarily
talk about quantum-mechanical probability assignments is anything but unequivocal.
We call Ψ(x, t) a state even though it is nothing but a probability measure|an algorithm
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for assigning probabilities to possible property-indicating events or states of aairs.) If
we represent the potentially attributable properties of a system as projection operators
on a Hilbert space H, there is no ambiguity about the form of the Born probability
measure p (qi, t), which is based solely on events concerning properties possessed by the
system before the time t [3, 4, 5]:
p (qi, t) = Tr[W(t)Pqi]. (1)
As is well known, W is a unique density operator [that is, a unique self-adjoint, positive
operator satisfying Tr(W) = 1 and W2  W]. Tr signies the trace dened by the
formula Tr(X) :=
∑
ihijXjii for any orthonormal basis fjiig in H. If W2 = W, W(t)
projects on a one-dimensional subspace of H and thus is equivalent|apart from an
irrelevant phase factor|to a \state" vector jψ(t)i. Such a \state" is said to be \pure",
and the system is said to be \prepared" in it. With W(t) = jψ(t)ihψ(t)j and Pqi =
jqiihqij, we obtain the familiar Born rule:
p (qi, t) = Tr (jψ(t)ihψ(t)jPqi) = hψ(t)jPqijψ(t)i = jhψ(t)jqiij2. (2)
According to the Born rule, the probability that a system with a prepared probability
measure jaihaj will rst be observed to have the property jqiihqij and then be found in
possession of the property jbihbj, is:
p (qi, bja) = jhajqiihqijbij2. (3)
(For simplicity’s sake, we will assume that the Hamiltonian is zero between the prepa-
ration and the rst measurement and between the rst and the second measurement.)
Although readers familiar with the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics are
not likely to stumble over this equation, it involves a conceptual transition that needs
to be justied. When we ask for the probability that qi given a, the projection operator
jqiihqij represents a potentially attributable property of the system. When we ask for
the probability that b given qi, the same operator represents a probability measure. How
do we get from a property to a probability measure?
If we start out with a probability measure W1 = jaihaj and then nd that the system
actually has the property P, we must update our probability measure accordingly. If the
measurement that yields the property P is ideal|as is generally assumed in discussions
of interpretational issues,|the updated probability measure assigns probability zero to
any property P′ for which PP′ = 0. Hence the \state" of the system \collapses"|not




The denominator ensures that the probability of the trivial property, represented by
the identity operator 1, remains 1. If we put jqiihqij in place of P, this reduces itself
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to W2 = jqiihqij. Thus the updated probability measure is represented by the same
operator as the property observed [6].
Next, we consider the probability that a system with a prepared probability measure
jaihaj will be found in possession of the property jbihbj given that in the meantime Q is
measured but regardless of the result of this measurement. This is obviously the sum
of probabilities
p (bja,Q) = ∑
j
jhajqjihqjjbij2. (5)
According to Bayes’ theorem, the probability that the intervening measurement yields
qi given that the prepared probability measure is jaihaj and given that the nal mea-
surement yields b, is





This is (one of the possible forms of) the ABL rule, which was rst derived by Aharonov,
Bergmann, and Lebowitz [7]. Like the Born rule, it follows straight from the quantum-
mechanical representation of properties as projection operators on a Hilbert space.
In principle, both rules have an objective as well as a subjective application. If Q is
actually measured, both rules assign probabilities that are subjective inasmuch they are
based on probability measures that fail to take account of at least one relevant fact|the
result of the measurement of Q. A quantum-mechanical probability can be considered
objective only if it is assigned to a possible result of a measurement that is not actually
performed. But this is not sucient. To be considered objective, the assignment must
be based on all relevant facts. Since Born probabilities take no account of the relevant
facts about the system’s future properties, they can be considered objective only if there
aren’t any such facts. This is hardly ever the case. Hence in general objective quantum-
mechanical probabilities must be calculated according to the ABL rule. We can drop
the qualifying \in general" if we use the trivial property in place of jbihbj when there
aren’t any relevant facts about the system’s future properties. In this case the ABL rule











Thus objective probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule, and they are
assigned to contrary-to-fact conditionals, or counterfactuals, of the following general
form:
(A) If a measurement of observable Q were performed on system S between the (ac-
tual) preparation of the probability measure jaihaj at time ta and the (actual)
observation of the property jbihbj at time tb, but no measurement is actually per-
formed between ta and tb, the measurement of Q would yield qi with probability
p (qija, b).
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For p (qija, b) to be objective, it is not enough that Q is not actually measured; it is
necessary that no measurement is performed between ta and tb. If any other measure-
ment M is performed during this time span, p (qija, b) is based on an incomplete set of
facts|it does not take account of the result of M|and is therefore subjective.
According to Lewis [8], \[c]ounterfactuals are infected with vagueness, as everybody
agrees". No doubt. Most counterfactuals are vague because it is not clear how truth
values (\true" or \false"), or even probabilities, should be assigned to them. How
could we ascertain the truth, or the likelihood of the truth, of a counterfactual like the
following? (X) \If Julius Caesar had not been assassinated, we would all be Buddhists
today." Counterfactuals are often discussed in the framework of possible worlds. There
are countless possible worlds in which Julius Caesar lived but was not assassinated. On
which of those worlds are we to base our assessment of the probable truth of (X)? On
all of them?|Then how are we to assign weights to them? Or on the one \closest to the
actual world"?|Then how are we to assign distances to the possible worlds (of which
the actual world is one)?
Fortunately, none of these worries arise if we are concerned exclusively with quantum
counterfactuals to which objective probabilities can be assigned. These probabilities are
unequivocally given by the ABL rule. If we think of the measurement of Q as taking
place in a possible world, we consider a world in which all the relevant facts are exactly
as they are in the actual world, except that in this possible world there is one additional
relevant fact indicating the value possessed by Q at a time between ta and tb. We don’t
need to weight possible worlds, and we don’t need to measure their distances. Thus
there is nothing vague about quantum counterfactuals to which objective probabilities
can be assigned.
One nal point. In Ref. [2] I have laid emphasis on the fact that all quantum-
mechanical probability assignments presuppose measurements. Both Born probabilities
and ABL probabilities are conditional on the observable that is measured, the time at
which this is measured, and the existence of a result. Quantum mechanics never tells us
how likely it is that the possession by S of a given property q will be indicated, anymore
than it tells us when a given property q will be indicated. It tells us how likely is that the
property qi will be indicated given that one of the possible values of Q will be indicated
and given the time at which this will be indicated.
2 REPLY TO KASTNER
Ruth Kastner [9] has raised several points concerning the appropriateness of objective
probability assignments, or probability assignments to counterfactuals, using the ABL
rule. She suggests that instead of the ABL rule (6) the following rule should be used:








As I have just pointed out, we cannot assign quantum-mechanical probabilities unless
we assume that a measurement is performed. If a measurement is actually performed,
the assigned probabilities are subjective. If it is counterfactually performed|that is, if
it is not actually performed but we consider the probability that it would have yielded qi
if it had been performed|then the assigned probabilities are objective, provided that no
other measurement is performed between ta and tb. In this case the correct probability
assignments are the best estimates that can be made in the one possible world in which
the measurement is made.
Kastner’s rule (8) combines, according to Bayes’ theorem, the probability p (qi, bja)
that a system with a prepared probability measure jaihaj will rst be observed to have
the property jqiihqij and then be found in possession of the property jbihbj, with the
probability p (bja) that an equally prepared system will be observed to have the property
jbihbj given that in the meantime no measurement is made. In the numerator she assumes
(as she should) that Q is measured, and in the denominator she assumes (contrary to
what she should do) that between ta and tb no measurement takes place. Kastner’s rule
is therefore applicable neither to the actual world (since the denominator implies that Q
is measured) nor to the one relevant possible world (since the denumerator implies that
no intervening measurement takes place). Surely, this is not the way to assign objective
probabilities to counterfactuals. The correct way to assign probabilities to the possible
results of an unperformed measurement is to place oneself squarely into the one possible
world in which the measurement is performed.
Kastner has misunderstood my objection (raised in a private communication) to rule
(8). Thinking that it was directed at the numerator, and specically at the appearance
there of the possible result qi, she points out that qi also appears in the Born rule (2),
regardless of whether Q is actually measured. \[T]he mere fact that [qi] appears in
the numerator does not signify that a measurement of [Q] is actually performed." I
fully agree. My objection was directed at the denominator, where qi should appear but
does not. (I have made it appear on the right-hand side, but only in the combination∑
j jqjihqjj, which is identical to the identity operator. This was to show that while in the
denominator of the ABL rule probabilities are added|the measurement is assumed to be
made,|in the denominator of Kastner’s rule amplitudes are added|the measurement
is not assumed to be made.)
Next, Kastner arguees that, whatever \new type of ‘counterfactual’ " I may have in
mind, it corresponds not to \what is generally understood as the relevant counterfactual
statement", i.e.:
(B) If a measurement of observable Q were performed on system S between the (ac-
tual) preparation of the probability measure jaihaj at time ta and the (actual)
observation of the property jbihbj at time tb, the measurement of Q would yield qi
with probability p (qija, b),
but only to the weaker statement:
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(C) In the possible world in which the probability measure jaihaj is prepared at the
time ta, in which system S is observed to possess property jbihbj at the time tb,
and in which observable Q is measured at some intermediate time, the probability
of obtaining result qi is given by p (qija, b).
If statement (C) is weaker than statement (B), it is because statement (B) does not rule
out that other measurements are performed between ta and tb. (B) is stronger than (C)
because it applies to several possible worlds while (C) refers to a single possible world.
Because it is not clear to which of these possible worlds (C) refers, (C) qualies as a
\might" counterfactual rather than as a bona fide \would" counterfactual, as pointed
out by Kastner. There is a possible world in which only Q is measured, there is another
possible world in which in addition observable R is measured, and so on. Since (C) does
not uniquely determine the possible world to which it refers, it warrants several \might"
counterfactuals rather than a single \would" counterfactual.
The relevant counterfactual, however, is not (B) but (A), and there is only one
possible world to which (A) applies. I am concerned with assignments of objective prob-
abilities. p (qija, b) is an objective probability only if no measurement is made between
ta and tb. The relevant possible world therefore is the one in which Q is the only mea-
surement that is made. By the same token, the relevant possible world for calculating
the objective probability p (rjja, b) is the one in which R is the only measurement that
is made. I may also want to know the objective probability p (qi, rjja, b) with which
both qi and rj would be obtained if rst Q and then R were measured in the interval
between ta and tb, and then the relevant possible world is the one in which both mea-
surements are made in the stipulated order. Each relevant counterfactual|that is, each
counterfactual of type (A)|uniquely determines a possible world. Being thus equivalent
to a counterfactual statement about a single possible world, it is a bona fide \would"
counterfactual.
Kastner asserts without proof that \would"-type counterfactual uses of the ABL rule
(6) are valid in special situations, in which the preselection and postselection outcomes
are eigenkets of (noncommuting) observables A andB and the counterfactually measured
observable is either A or B, but that they are generally invalid. \Proofs" to this eect
have been given by Sharp and Shanks [10], Cohen [11], and Miller [12], and have been
refuted|cogently, in my opinion|by Vaidman [13], though Kastner [14] has remained
unconvinced. What these \proofs" purport to show is that the counterfactual use of the
ABL rule yields results that are inconsistent with standard quantum mechanics. This
claim is derived from the following curious application of the ABL rule:
p (qjja) = p (qjja, b1) p (b1ja) + p (qjja, b2) p (b2ja)
=
p (qj, b1ja)
p (b1ja,Q) p (b1ja) +
p (qj , b2ja)
p (b2ja,Q) p (b2ja). (9)
It is argued that since the nal measurement of the binary observable B with eigenval-
ues b1 and b2 is actually made, the Born probability p (qjja) of the outcome qj of an
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intermediate measurement of Q ought to be the sum of the probabilities p (qj , b1ja) and












= p (bija). (10)
This condition is satised if Q = A or Q = B, or if for j 6= k,
< (hqkjaihajqjihqj jbiihbijqki) = 0. (11)
This is Kastner’s condition (2). It is then argued that since the counterfactual use of
the ABL rule in equation (9) generally leads to inconsistencies with standard quantum
mechanics, the counterfactual use of the ABL rule is illegitimate unless one of those
conditions is satised. However, what is illegitimate is not the counterfactual use of the
ABL rule but the equation on which this claim is based. Like Kastner’s rule (8), equation
(9) is a hybrid that applies neither to the actual world in which Q is not measured [since
the appearance of the ABL probabilities p (qjja, bi) implies that it is measured] nor to
the possible world in which Q is measured and the nal measurement yields bi [since the
appearance of the probabilities p (bija) implies that Q is not measured]. Part of the ar-
gument assumes that Q is measured, and the remainder of the argument assumes that Q
is not measured. Surely, this is not a consistent way to argue. Nor is it consistent to con-
clude that instead of the ABL probabilities p (qjja, bi) the probabilities pK(qj ja, bi) should
be used in equation (9) [which would ensure that p (qj ja) = p (qj, b1ja) + p (qj , b2ja)], for
the probabilities pK(qjja, bi) are themselves such hybrids. No matter whether the mea-
surement of Q is actually or counterfactually performed, we cannot assign probabilities
to its possible results unless we assume consistently that the measurement is made. This
entails that instead of the probabilities p (bija) the probabilities p (bija,Q) ought to be
used in equation (9), which likewise ensures that p (qjja) = p (qj, b1ja) + p (qj, b2ja).
Finally, Kastner claims that my denition of a counterfactual statement as a \con-
trary-to-fact conditional" is not consistent with the standard understanding of such a
statement. Who decides what is to be the standard understanding? The article on
counterfactuals by W.A. Davis in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [15] begins
with the words \counterfactuals, also called contrary-to-fact conditionals. . . ".
To conclude, Kastner’s objections are unfounded. In particular, the objective, coun-
terfactual application of the ABL rule is not restricted in the way she has claimed.
3 ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Consider the following experiment [16]. A particle is prepared with a probability measure
jψ1i = (jAi + jBi + jCi)/
p
3, and is eventually found in possession of the property
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jψ2ihψ2j, where jψ2i = (jAi + jBi − jCi)/
p
3. The projection operators PA = jAihAj,
PB, and PC represent the respective properties of being inside one of three sealed boxes
A, B, and C at an intermediate time t. According to the ABL rule (6), the property of
nding the particle inside box A at the time t is





As it stands, p (Ajψ1, ψ2) is underdetermined. To assign to it a value, we still have to
specify exactly which observable is being measured. If it is the observable Q whose
eigen-\states" are PA, PB, and PC , the denominator is given by












Since the numerator is equal to 1/9, p (Ajψ1, ψ2) is equal to 1/3. If on the other hand
we measure the binary observable QA = PA, the denominator is given by






and p (Ajψ1, ψ2) is equal to 1. By the same token, if we measure Q then p (Bjψ1, ψ2) =
1/3, and if we measure QB then p (Bjψ1, ψ2) = 1.
I would like to discuss these results in the context of a somewhat more realistic setup.
Consider a wall in which there are three holes A, B and C. In front of the wall there
is a particle source E. Behind the wall there is a particle detector D. Both E and D
are equidistant from the three holes. Behind C there is a device that causes a phase
shift by pi. Pj now represents the alternative \the particle goes through hole j", where
j may also stand for B [ C, the opening made up of B and C. Particles emitted by E
thus have the prepared probability measure jψ1i, and particles detected by D have the
retropared [17] probability measure jψ2i. (As Aharonov et al. [7] have shown, the nal
observation warrants retrodictions in the same way as the initial observation warrants
predictions.) To measure QA, we place near A a device FA that beeps whenever a
particle passes through A. To measure QB, we place near B a device FB that beeps
whenever a particle passes through B. To measure Q, we use both devices. (If the
devices are 100% ecient, the absence of a beep tells us that the particle went through
C.)
What we just found is this: If only FA is in place (in the actual world or in a possible
world), the particle goes through A with probability one. If only FB is in place, the
particle goes through B with probability one. If both beepers are in place, the particle
is equally likely to go through any of the three holes. Hence ABL probabilities are in
general contextual|they depend on the distinctions that a particular setup permits us
to make. By measuring Q we can tell whether the particle goes through A, through B, or
through C. By measuring QA, we can tell whether it goes through A or through B [C.
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In the former case three properties are available for predication|\through A", \through
B", and \through C",|in the latter two. In the former case three spatial distinctions
are warranted|between A and B, between A and C, and between B and C,|in the
latter case only one is warranted. p (Ajψ1, ψ2) depends on the spatial distinctions that
are warranted within the complement of A in A [ B [ C. If none are warranted by
the experimental setup then p (Ajψ1, ψ2) = 1. If the distinction between B and C is
warranted by the setup then p (Ajψ1, ψ2) = 1/3.
The contextuality of ABL probabilities associated with quantum counterfactuals
makes it obvious that probability one does not imply actual possession (of a value
by an observable, or of a property by a physical system): From our ability to infer
with probability one the result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, it does not
follow that at the time t there exists an element of reality corresponding to the physical
quantity and having a value equal to the predicted measurement result. Hence the only
reason we have for attributing a contingent property [17] q to a physical system is the
occurrence/existence of an actual event or state of aairs from which the possession of
q can be inferred, or by which it is indicated. The contextuality of ABL probabilities
implies that the contingent properties of physical systems are extrinsic: They supervene
on what happens or is the case in the rest of the world, whether this be the actual
world or the possible world under consideration. Owing to their contextuality, ABL
probabilities cannot be assigned without specifying the entire range of values of the
observable that is measured or assumed to be measured. And owing to their extrinsic
nature, contingent properties cannot be attributed unless their possession is warranted
by facts.
It may be held that, unlike an ABL probability equal to one, a Born probability
equal to one is sucient for the possession of a value [18], or that an element of reality
corresponding to an eigenvalue of an observable Q exists at a time t if the Born proba-
bility measure for the time t has the pure form jψ(t)ihψ(t)j and jψ(t)i is an eigenstate of
Q. But this is an error. The extrinsic nature of contingent properties can be established
without invoking the contextuality of ABL probabilities, as was done in Ref. [2]. The
contextuality of ABL probabilities therefore merely conrms it.
Cohen [11] states that in standard quantum mechanics, probabilities for obtaining
particular results are not contextual. What he means is that Born probabilities are
not contextual. As I have shown in Sec. 1, both the Born rule and the ABL rule fol-
low straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of properties as projection
operators on a Hilbert space. Both therefore are tools of standard quantum mechan-
ics. Cohen further states that the product rule is always valid in standard quantum
mechanics. According to the product rule, if X and Y are commuting observables, if a
measurement of X will yield x with Born probability one and a measurement of Y will
yield y with Born probability one, then a measurement of XY will yield xy with Born
probability one. This too is a statement about Born probabilities, not a statement about
standard quantum mechanics. ABL probabilities do not always satisfy the product rule,
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and therefore standard quantum mechanics does not always satisfy the product rule.
The operators QA = PA and QB = PB commute; a measurement of QA would yield 1
(\through A") with probability one; a measurement of QB would yield 1 (\through B")
with probability one; yet a measurement of QAQB would yield 0 since QAQB = 0.
It should be noted, however, that there isn’t any possible world in which the product
rule is \violated", for there isn’t any possible world in which QAQB is measured. While
QA is measured in the possible world in which only FA is in place, QB is measured in the
possible world in which only FB is in place. Thus is it logically impossible for both QA
and QB to be measured in the same world. (In the former world, the distinction between
A and B [C is warranted but not the distinction between B and C. In the latter world
the distinction between B and A [ C is warranted but not the distinction between A
and C. But if the distinction between A and B [ C and the distinction between B
and A [ C are warranted, then the distinction between B and C and the distinction
between A and C are warranted, too.) What is measured in the possible world in which
both beepers are in place, is not QAQB but Q. The product rule is \violated" only by
combinations of counterfactual statements that refer to dierent possible worlds.
Each type of probability has its specic use. The ABL rule is obviously of no use
for predicting the result of a measurement performed at a time t, for its application
presupposes knowledge of the results of measurements performed after the time t. [If
the measurement at the time t is the last measurement ever to be performed on the
system, we would have to know this in order to have sucient information for applying
the ABL rule (6) with the trivial property 1 in place of jbihbj.] The Born rule, on the
other hand, is of little use when it comes to sounding the ontological implications of
quantum mechanics, or so I will argue.
With Mermin [1] I believe that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be
reduced to the single puzzle posed by the existence of objective probabilities. Objective
probabilities, as was shown in Sec. 1, are ABL probabilities. ABL probabilities reduce
to Born probabilities only if the measurement to the possible results of which they are
assigned, is (or is assumed to be) the last measurement ever to be performed on the
system. Otherwise the Born rule fails to take all relevant facts into account, no matter
whether that measurement is actually or counterfactually performed. It does not reflect
the objective situation, and therefore it is of no use for making ontological inferences.
The objective situation contains temporal relations between actual events and/or
states of aairs. It further encompasses the objective probabilities that we assign to
counterfactuals on the basis of (i) actual events and states of aairs and (ii) the statis-
tical laws of quantum mechanics. Statistical laws warrant probabilistic counterfactual
inferences, and in my opinion it is these objectively warranted counterfactual inferences
that hold the key to the mysteries of quantum mechanics. What the objective situation
does not contain is anything corresponding to the experiential now. The present can be
characterized by its bright and colorful presence in our consciousness, which contrasts
sharply with the shadowlike reality of something that is merely remembered or expected.
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But this dierence is qualitative, nonquantiable, unmeasurable. We have no way of
objectively characterizing the present, and therefore physics \knows nothing of now" [1].
And since the past and the future are dened only in relation to the present, we have no
way of objectively distinguishing between the past and the future. In physics we may
qualify events or states of aairs as past, present, or future relative to other events or
states of aairs (which boils down to arming temporal relations), but we cannot speak
of the past, the present, or the future.
Unfortunately, the subjectively warranted but objectively unwarranted distinction
between the past, the present, and the future permeates and vitiates our thinking about
the objective world|the world accessible to physics. That distinction seems to be jus-
tied by the appearance of irreducible probabilities in a fundamental physical theory.
This appearance argues that there is something objectively undetermined or \open".
We are familiar with the notion of an open future|a notion central to the fabric of our
active lives; hence our tendency to identify this open future with what is objectively un-
determined or open: Physics is in the business of predicting the odds of possible future
events; hence our preference for Born probabilities. But the identication is illegitimate,
for it rests on the physically unwarranted distinction between the future and the past.
The proper business of physics is to formulate the deterministic or statistical regularities
among actual events and/or states of aairs. The extensive use we make of our knowl-
edge of these regularities in predicting the future|and in our attempts to control it|has
created the wrong impression that physics is fundamentally concerned with predictions.
In reality, physics is fundamentally concerned with the objective situation, and this has
nothing to do with our purely qualitative temporal distinctions. The objective situation
has no place for our ignorance of the future. It contains temporal relations, and so it
contains objective temporal relata|actual events and states of aairs|irrespective of
how these (subjectively) relate to the experiential now. Where physics is concerned, the
future is as closed as the past, and the past is as open as the future [2, 19].
The relevant distinction is not that between the future and the past but that between
(i) the factual situation|the spatiotemporal totality of facts, particularly property-
indicating facts or actual results of performed measurements|and (ii) the possible re-
sults of unperformed measurements. What is objectively determined or closed is neither
the past nor the future but the spatiotemporal totality of facts, and what is objectively
undetermined or open is neither the future nor the past but the probabilities and truth
values associated with contrary-to-fact conditionals [20]. The probabilities are undeter-
mined because they are contextual|the likelihood of nding the particle in A depends
on the setup,|and the truth values are undetermined because contingent properties
are extrinsic. (Saying that the statement \S is q" has an undetermined truth value
is the same as saying that it is neither true nor false but meaningless.) We cannot
assign objective probabilities without specifying an experimental setup, and we cannot
assign truth values to attributions of properties or values without actually performing
the experiment. But we can, on the basis of the statistical laws of quantum mechanics,
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assign setup-specic probabilities to the possible results of unperformed experiments,
and these objective probabilities are the proper foundation for ontological inferences.
Perhaps the most important inference to be drawn concerns the contingent reality
of spatial distinctions, which is inconsistent with the customary conceptualization of
space as something that exists by itself (rather than by virtue of the relative positions of
material objects) and that contains, as subsets, all conceivable spatial divisions [2, 21]. If
all conceivable spatial divisions were intrinsic to space, they would have an unconditional
reality, and one of the following statements would necessarily be true of every object S
contained in the union R [ R′ of two spatial regions: (i) S is inside R; (ii) S is inside
R′; (iii) S has two parts, one in R and one in R′. No particle could ever pass through
the union of two slits without passing through either slit in particular and without
consisting of parts that pass through dierent slits, which is precisely what particles do
when interference fringes are observed in two-slit experiments (and we do not postulate
hidden variables). What the interference fringes are trying to tell us is that spatial
distinctions are as extrinsic as the positions of material objects: Instead of having a
reality of their own, they supervene on the actual goings-on in the physical world, and
they may be real for one object and nonexistent for another object. In our three-hole
experiment it is the presence of FA that makes the dierence between A and B [ C a
reality for the particle, and that makes the particle behave accordingly. A dierent set
of beepers realizes a dierent set of spatial distinctions and makes the particle behave
in a dierent manner. If nothing indicates the opening taken by the particle, none of
the distinctions we make between the parts of A[B [C|including mereological parts
like B [ C| exist for the particle.
Since no material object ever has a numerically exact position (relative to any other
material object), no material object can indicate a numerically exact position. And since
no material object can indicate a numerically exact position, no material object ever has
a numerically exact positions. There aren’t any detectors with sharply dened sensitive
regions. Hence if we conceptually partition space into smaller and smaller regions, we
sooner or later arrive at a partition into finite regions that are so small that the dierence
between them has no reality at all: There isn’t any material object for which it exists.
Our conceptual spatial distinctions bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities. We
can calculate the probability of nding a particle if detectors with suciently small and
sharply dened regions were in place, even though no such detectors exist in the physical
world. At a suciently ne scale, all we can say is counterfactual and probabilistic, and
this tells us that the world is only nitely dierentiated spacewise. Conversely, the fact
that the spatial dierentiation of the world has a nite limit nds adequate expression
in the counterfactual assignment of probabilities.
The times at which contingent properties are possessed, are indicated by possessed
positions. Since possessed positions are extrinsic, so are the times at which contingent
properties are possessed. And since possessed positions lack exact values, so do these
times. It follows that the reality of temporal distinctions is as contingent as the reality
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of spatial distinctions, and that the temporal dierentiation of the world, too, has a
nite limit [2, 21].
As long as we retain notions based on objectively meaningless temporal distinctions,
these conclusions will remain incomprehensible. The objective situation, I said, contains
temporal relations, and so it contains temporal relata. If we conceive of the relata, we
conceive of them at the same time, even though they happen or obtain at different times.
Since we can’t help it, that has to be OK. But it is denitely not OK if we introduce
into our simultaneous and spatial mental picture of a temporal whole a present that
moves or advances forward or upward across the temporal whole. One can’t represent
the spatiotemporal whole as a simultaneous spatial whole and then imagine the present
as moving through it. To do so is to depict the spatiotemporal whole W as persisting
unchanged in a time that is extraneous to W, and to depict the present as advancing
through the unchanging W in that extraneous time. There is only one time, the fourth
dimension of space-time. There is not another time in which the present \advances"
through space-time as if space-time itself|rather than our mental picture of it|were a
persisting and unchanging whole.
If we commit this error|and we had better admit that we do so habitually|then
the fact that the experiential now is temporally undierentiated and unextended, leads
us directly to the notion of an objective instantaneous state that evolves in time. This
leads us on to the notion that the spatiotemporal whole can be dierentiated into a
(not necessarily unique) one-parameter family of simultaneities (constant-time hyper-
surfaces), each representing the state of the world at a precise time. And this leads
us on to the notion that time is innitely dierentiated|a set of instants. And this
contradicts the conclusion that the world is only nitely dierentiated timewise. Thus
until we cease to insinuate our qualitative temporal distinctions into the world of physics,
the nite temporal dierentiation of the world will remain incomprehensible, and hence
undiscovered. If the present is anywhere in the spatiotemporal whole, it is trivially and
vacuously everywhere (or, rather, everywhen): Each observed event or state of aairs
has had or will have its glorious moment of technicolor reality. No inferences to the
actual temporal dierentiation of the world can be drawn from this.
In quantum-mechanical context, the same error makes us think of a quantum \state"
W(t) as an instantaneous state|something that evolves continuously in an intrinsically
and innitely dierentiated time until it \collapses"|mysteriously rather than self-
evidently|into a dierent \state". This fairy tale compounds two mistakes. It treats
W(t) as an actual state of aairs rather than as a probability measure, for only an
actual state of aairs can exist in time; the probability of being found at the time t is
not something that exists at the time t, anymore than the probability of being found
in box A is something that exists in box A. Apart from this category mistake, it treats
the parameter t as representing a \continuum" of intrinsically distinct instants, at each
of which the corresponding \state" W(t) \obtains". In reality, t is the specified time of
an actually or counterfactually performed measurement. If we use W(t) to assign Born
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probabilities to the possible outcomes of a specic future measurement, we assume that
this measurement is made, and we assume that it is made at the time t. W(t) is good
for only one time t. Once the measurement is made and its result is taken into account,
W(t) has to be replaced by a dierent probability measure W′(t), for reasons that are
obvious rather than mysterious.
The unwarranted (in fact, inconsistent) notion of an evolving instantaneous state
(implied by the erroneous notion of an advancing objective present) prevents us from
understanding how the time between the preparation of jψ1i at time t1 and the retropa-
ration of jψ2i at time t2 can be nonexistent or \empty" for the particles under consid-
eration. If we could bring ourselves to stop imagining an instantaneous present that
advances continuously from t1 to t2, it would no longer be impossible for us to see that
there isn’t any particular time t between t1 and t2 that is real for the particle, anymore
than the distinction between A and its complement in A[B [C is real for the particle.
A particular (but not necessarily exact) time is real for a system if and only if it is the
indicated time of possession of an indicated property. Times supervene on facts, just
like positions. If between t1 and t2 the particle lacks indicated properties, a fortiori it
lacks indicated times, and this is the same as saying that a particular intermediate time
does not exist for the particle. Time is dierentiated by property-indicating events. It
is a set of temporal relations between such events. If between two such events e1 and e2
there isn’t any other such event, then the time between the two events is \empty", in
the sense that between e1 and e2 there isn’t anything that is temporally related to e1 or
e2; there is only the relation between e1 and e2. Least of all is there an instantaneous
objective present or state that moves continuously from e1 to e2 in an innitely dier-
entiated time. This innitely (and intrinsically) dierentiated time is a pure gment of
our imagination, as is the idea of an innitely and intrinsically dierentiated space.
Cohen [11] appears to reject the counterfactual use of the ABL rule not only on the
basis of the (semantically inconsistent) equation (9) but also on the ground that it is
\not consistent with realist interpretations of quantum mechanics". This, however, is
no ground for rejecting the counterfactual use of the ABL rule. Rather, it is a ground
for rejecting realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. By \realist interpretations"
Cohen may mean interpretations that endorse either Redhead’s [18] suciency condition
or the so-called \eigenstate-eigenvalue link". According to the former, Born probability
one is sucient for the existence of an element of reality. According to the latter, \being
in" an eigenstate of some observable is sucient. In reality, neither is sucient. Or he
may mean interpretations that construe W(t) as an actual state of aairs that evolves in
an innitely dierentiated time. Such interpretations commit the twofold error of con-
fusing possibilities with actualities and of applying our qualitative temporal distinctions
where they don’t belong. Does it follow that no ontological interpretation of quantum
mechanics is possible? I submit that it is only when the wrong realist interpretations
are rejected that the correct ontological interpretation can be comprehended or found.
The highlights of this interpretation, outlined in this section, are the contingent reality
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of spatial and temporal distinctions and the existence of nite limits to both the spatial
and the temporal dierentiation of the world [2, 19].
References
[1] N. David Mermin, \What is quantum mechanics trying to tell us?", Am. J. Phys.
66, 753{767 (1998).
[2] Ulrich Mohrho, \What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us", forthcoming in
Am. J. Phys. (2000).
[3] J.M. Jauch, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,
1968), pp. 92{94, 132.
[4] A. Cassinello and J.L. Sanchez-Gomez, \On the probabilistic postulate of quantum
mechanics", Found. Phys. 26, 1357{1374 (1996).
[5] A.M. Gleason, \Measures on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space", J. of Rat.
Mech. and Analysis 6, 885{894 (1957).
[6] Much confusion can be avoided by maintaining a strict distinction between projec-
tion operators representing probability measures and projection operators repre-
senting potentially attributable properties. If a system with a vanishing Hamilto-
nian is observed to possess the property jψihψj at the time t0, the Born probabilities
of the possible results of any measurement performed at a time t > t0 are given by
the probability measure jψihψj. Sloppiness about the distinction between probabil-
ity measures and properties leads to the insidious notion that the system possesses
the property jψihψj not only at the time t0, when it is factually warranted, but
also at the time t > t0, when the possession of this property is not warranted by
any facts [2].
[7] Yakir Aharonov, Peter G. Bergmann, and Joel L. Lebowitz, \Time symmetry in the
quantum process of measurement", Phys. Rev. 134B, 1410{1416 (1964); reprinted
in Quantum Theory and Measurement, edited by John Archibald Wheeler and
Wojciech Hubert Zurek (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1983), pp.
680{686.
[8] David K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume II (Oxford University Press, New
York, 1986), p. 34.
[9] R.E. Kastner, \Comment on Mohrho’s ‘What quantum mechanics is trying to
tell us’ ", submitted to Am. J. Phys.; Eprint quant-ph/0003098v3.
15
[10] W.D. Sharp and N. Shanks, \The rise and fall of time-symmetrized quantum me-
chanics", Philos. Sci. 60, 488{499 (1993).
[11] O. Cohen, \Pre- and postselected quantum systems, counterfactual measurements,
and consistent histories", Phys. Rev. A 51, 4373{4380 (1995).
[12] D.J. Miller, \Realism and time symmetry in quantum mechanics", Phys. Letters
A 222, 31{36 (1996).
[13] Lev Vaidman, \Defending time-symmetrized quantum counterfactuals", Stud.
Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 30, 373{397 (1999).
[14] R.E. Kastner, \Time-symmetrized quantum theory, counterfactuals, and ‘advanced
action’ ", Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 30, 237{259 (1999).
[15] Robert Audi, general editor, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1995), pp. 163{164.
[16] Lev Vaidman, \Weak-measurement elements of reality", Found. Phys. 26, 895{906
(1996).
[17] Denitions of unfamiliar terms are given in the Appendix of Ref. [2].
[18] Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism (Clarendon, Oxford,
1987), p. 72.
[19] Ulrich Mohrho, \Objectivity, retrocausation, and the experiment of Englert,
Scully and Walther", Am. J. Phys. 67, 330-335 (1999).
[20] I use \objectively determined" in the sense of \possessing a denite property or
value from a given range of distinguishable properties or values", and I use \ob-
jectively undetermined" in the sense of \lacking such a denite property or value"
(for instance, going through B [ C without going either through B or through C
and without consisting of two parts|one going through B and one going through
C). No causal connotation is intended.
[21] Ulrich Mohrho, \The one, the many, and the quantum", submitted; Eprint quant-
ph/0005110.
16
